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ualty Co. v. Headers, supra, in which this question has been considered.
It is settled law in other jurisdictions, however, that, in the absence of
any policy provision on the subject, an injury inflicted upon the insured
by a third person, designedly and intentionally so far as the actor is
concerned, is an accident as to him and authorizes a recovery under an
accident policy, Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Wyness, 107 Ga. 584 (3), 589,
34 S.E. 113 (1899); American Accident Co. v. Carson, 99 Ky. 441,
36 S.W. x69, 34 L.R.A. 301, 59 Am. St. Rep. 473 (1896); New-
sonw v. Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 143 Ga. 785, 85 S.E.
1035 (1915); General fccident, Fire and Life Assur. Corporation v.
Hymes, 77 Okla. 2o, i85 Pac. IO85 (I919); 14 R.C.L. I26O; 22
Ohio Jur. 661.
This concept must be distinguished from a situation in which the
injury has been the result of the intentional act of the person claiming
under the accident policy. In that situation it is settled law that the
injury is not the result of an accident. New A9msterdam Casualty Co.
v. Johnson, 91 Ohio St. i55, L.R.A. 19i6B iox8, iio N.E. 475
(1914).
It should also be noted that if the injury intentionally inflicted by a
third party has been the result of some act of provocation on the part of
the insured he is precluded from recovery under an accident policy.
Hutton v. States Accident Ins. Co., 267 Ill. 267, io8 N.E. 296, L.R.A.
19 15E (1915); Prudential Casualty Co. v. Curry, io Ala. App. 642,
65 So. 852 (1914).
In view of the body of law contrary to the principal case and the
rather dubious basis on which it was predicated, it is difficult to believe
that the instant case represents the settled law of Ohio on this important
point. It would seem more likely that if the question should be carried
to the court of last resort, it would be decided in conformity with the
settled law of other states, viz., that an accident insurance policy covers
a situation in which the insured is injured as a result of the intentional
act of a third party. From this it would follow that an insurance com-
pany would be held liable under a liability policy for injuries to a guest
occasioned by the wilful or wanton misconduct of the driver.
GEORGE BAILEY.
LIABILITY OF .AN EMPLOYER FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
Defendant corporation owned a clothing store in front of which,
and overhanging the sidewalk, was an electric sign. The defendant
contracted with the Power Co. to keep the sign in repair. The obliga-
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tions of the contract were later assumed by the Edison Co., and the
latter hired a Sign Co. to paint the sign. In the course of that work
an employee of the Sign Co. permitted a bucket of paint to fall on the
plaintiff. Plaintiff's petition charged defendant with negligence in that
it knew repairs were being made on the sign and failed to give any warn-
ing thereof to pedestrians or station any guards to divert the course of
pedestrians from under such sign. Defendant entered a general denial
and at the trial claimed exemption from liability on the ground that the
negligence, if any was shown, was that of an independent contractor.
Plaintiff argued, and the court held, that the case came within an excep-
tion to the general rule of non-liability for the negligence of one engaged
as an independent contractor. Richman Brothers Co. v. Miller, 1 31
Ohio St. 424, 3 N.E. (2d) 359, 6 Ohio Op. 114, 9 Ohio Bar 16,
July 13, 1936.
This case, as far as the Ohio law is concerned, adds a new exception
to the general rule of non-liability for the negligence of an independent
contractor. Probably the court did not realize that it was taking another
step forward because the case was decided on the basis of broad general
statements in the syllabi of previous decisions. English courts, however,
have gone much farther-to the point where exceptions have very nearly
swallowed up the rule. Leading writers on the law of torts believe that
sound social policy calls for still further inroads upon the rule of non-
liability. Harper, The Law of Torts, p. 646; Restatement of the Law
of Torts, Tentative Draft No. 6, Explanatory Notes by the Reporter,
Francis H. Bohlen, p. 59.
One of the earliest Ohio cases in this field was Clark v. Fry, 8
Ohio St. 358 (1858). In that case the employer let the entire work
of constructing a building to an independent contractor. It was held that
the employer was not liable to a person who was injured when he fell
into an excavation negligently left unguarded by the independent con-
tractor. In succeeding cases the doctrine of this case has been strictly
limited to the facts upon which it was announced. Thus where the
independent contractor dug a ditch entirely across a street, the employer
was held liable to one who fell into the ditch and was injured. Railroad
Co. v. Morey, 47 Ohio St. 207, 24 N.E. 269, 7 L.R.A. 701 (189o).
The decision went upon the ground that the injury was one that might
have been anticipated as a direct or probable consequence of the per-
formance of the work if reasonable care was omitted.- Similarly, where
the employer himself dug a hole in the sidewalk and turned over to an
independent contractor the work of building vaults and walls, the
employer was liable for the negligence of the contractor in leaving the
hole unguarded. Hawver v. Whalen, 49 Ohio St. 69, 29 N.E. 1049,
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14 L.R.A. 828 (1892). Where a city is under a statutory duty to
keep its streets in reasonably safe condition, it is liable for the negligence
of an independent contractor in leaving an excavation unguarded. Circle-
ville v. Neuding, 41 Ohio St. 465 (1885).
Another leading Ohio case is Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co.
v. Steinbrock & Patrick, 6i Ohio St. 215, 55 N.E. 618, 76 Am. St.
Rep. 375 (1899). There a brick wall was left standing in a dangerous
condition after a fire. The employer was held liable for the negligence
of an independent contractor who was hired to take down the wall and
failed to adopt a reasonably safe method. Minshall, J. discussed a great
number of English cases and quoted from Penny v. Wimbledon Urban
Council, 2 L.R.Q.B. 212, 217 (1898): "where a person employs a
contractor to do work in a place where the public are in the habit of
passing, which work will, unless precautions are taken, cause danger to
the public, an obligation is thrown upon the person who orders the work
to be done to see that the necessary precautions are taken." He thought
that the principle applied directly to the case he was deciding. This
quotation, with the substitution of "reasonable precautions". for "the
necessary precautions," is paragraph No. 2 of the syllabus of the prin-
cipal case. A dictum by Minshall, J. on page 230 of the Covington
Bridge case, is interesting: "It (the negligence) was not collateral to
the employment, as would have been the case had a servant of the
contractor, while at work, negligently let fall a brick upon a person in
passing by." The distinction between Minshall's hypothetical case and
the principal case is not readily apparent. Quite possibly Minshall would
have found the negligent dropping of the paint bucket collateral to the
employment. Or, if we say that the negligence consisted in the failure
to rope off the sidewalk, it must also have been negligence not to keep
the public at a safe distance from the wall on which the work was being
done in the hypothetical case. The quotation from the English case,
however, is broad enough to cover either situation, and it seems likely
in view of the language used in the principal case that the court would
hold the employer liable for collateral negligence as well as for negli-
gence intimately connected with the work to be done. At page 432 in
the principal case the court said: "Defendants owed to the plaintiff and
the public while in the use of the sidewalk in front of their premises a
duty and obligation to see that reasonable care was exercised for their
protection from injury while the sign projecting over the sidewalk from
their building was undergoing repair." The important fact seems to be
that the work was being done in a public place.
Paragraph No. i of the syllabus in the Covington Bridge case, supra,
is Paragraph No. I of the syllabus in the principal case, and it also states
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the rule somewhat more broadly than most American cases would
justify. It reads in part as follows: "Where danger to others is likely
to attend the doing of a certain work, unless care is observed, the person
having it to do is under a duty to see that it is done with reasonable
care." In Warden v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 123 Ohio St. 305, 175
N.E. 207 (931), that syllabus was read to the jury, and they were
told to decide whether or not the work was dangerous. The instruction
was approved by the Supreme Court. The work being done was the
construction of a temporary trestle over a busy street, and the negligence
consisted in leaving a plank extending over the highway in such a posi-
tion that the plaintiff ran into it and was injured. The language used
above is similar to that in Section 297 of the Restatement: "One who
employs an independent contractor to do work which is inherently
dangerous to others is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to them
by the contractor's failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm
resulting from the dangerous character of the work." The comment
and the explanatory notes, however, make it rather clear that the section
applies only to ultra-hazardous work or work involving the use of ultra-
hazardous instrumentalities, such as blasting, the use of fire in clearing
land, and the tearing down of high walls.
Unless we can say that the work of painting the sign was inher-
ently dangerous, it is submitted that none of the propositions stated in
the Restatement of the Law of Torts is broad enough to impose liability
in the principal case. Indeed, the negligence in the principal case would
probably be classed as collateral negligence. See comments and illustra-
tions in Sections 296 and 297. But the Reporter was careful to explain
that the American Law Institute did not intend to discourage further
extensions of liability. Tentative Draft No. 6, page 59.
D. M. POSTLEWAITE.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
RIGHT OF FINDER AS AGAINST THmRD PERSON
Plaintiff, as an employee of the Toledo Trust Co. operated an elec-
tric door from a cage, admitting identified safety deposit customers,
employees who worked in the offices in the rear and on the second floor,
and visitors. In July, I92O, plaintiff found an unmarked envelope
containing five hundred dollars on the floor of the small lobby adjacent
to her cage. She reported it to the vice-president of the bank, who
placed the money in a special account. Upon a demand for the money
and a refusal, plaintiff sued in July, 1933. It was held that the judg-
